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Individual differences in reading
social intentions from motor deviants
Daniel Lewkowicz, Francois Quesque, Yann Coello and Yvonne N. Delevoye-Turrell*
SCALab, UMR CNRS 9193, Department of Psychology, Université de Lille, Villeneuve-d’Ascq, France
As social animals, it is crucial to understand others’ intention. But is it possible to detect
social intention in two actions that have the exact same motor goal? In the present study,
we presented participants with video clips of an individual reaching for and grasping
an object to either use it (personal trial) or to give his partner the opportunity to use it
(social trial). In Experiment 1, the ability of naïve participants to classify correctly social
trials through simple observation of short video clips was tested. In addition, detection
levels were analyzed as a function of individual scores in psychological questionnaires of
motor imagery, visual imagery, and social cognition. Results revealed that the between-
participant heterogeneity in the ability to distinguish social from personal actions was
predicted by the social skill abilities. A second experiment was then conducted to assess
what predictive mechanism could contribute to the detection of social intention. Video
clips were sliced and normalized to control for either the reaction times (RTs) or/and the
movement times (MTs) of the grasping action. Tested in a second group of participants,
results showed that the detection of social intention relies on the variation of both RT and
MT that are implicitly perceived in the grasping action. The ability to use implicitly these
motor deviants for action-outcome understanding would be the key to intuitive social
interaction.
Keywords: perception, action, social cognition, intention, observation, kinematics
Introduction
Understanding what a conspecific is doing represents a crucial ability for our everyday social
interactions. However, perceiving an action and understanding the reason that drives this behavior
may arise from different processes (Spaulding, 2015). As highly social species, it is crucial for us to
perceive others’mental states and to predict what they plan to do in order to adapt and coordinate our
own behavior to the surrounding context (Hamilton, 2009; Sebanz andKnoblich, 2009). As such, our
ability to understand the goal of others’ actions relies on a variety of sources (Frith and Frith, 2006).
For example, declarative knowledge (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) and indirect interaction (Singer
et al., 2004) are indices that are used when judging the reason of others’ behavior. Contextual cues,
such as environmental and physical constraints of an action also help to detect the aim of observed
actions (Brass et al., 2007; Stapel et al., 2012). However, experimental evidences now support the
hypothesis that humans have the ability to predict the action-outcome goals on the basis of the
observation of its early kinematics only (Orliaguet et al., 1996; Knoblich and Flach, 2001; Sebanz and
Shiffrar, 2009). Indeed, it has been shown that observers are sensitive to early differences in visual
kinematics and can use them to discriminate between movements performed with different object-
oriented motor intentions (Méary et al., 2005; Manera et al., 2011; Sartori et al., 2011). However, it
is the case that most gestures are socially oriented: I can reach for a cup and place it on a table in
order to use it myself, but often I will reach for an object to give it to my partner. The question that
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will be considered here is then: Can my partner detect in a
predictive manner whether the cup that I am grasping for is for
her or not, simply by observing my hand moving?
After considering the literature that discusses how intentions
may shape movement kinematics, we will state the differences
that are rarely made between motor and social intentions in
experimental settings. More specifically, we will reveal the
individual differences in the ability to detect social intention
when simply observing the motor deviants contained within 3D
movement kinematics.
Kinematic studies in humans have shown that different motor
intentions can shape the spatio-temporal characteristics of a
reach-to-grasp movement depending on the goal of the executed
sequence (Marteniuk et al., 1987; Armbrüster and Spijkers, 2006;
Ansuini et al., 2008; Naish et al., 2013). For example, people tend
to produce slower motor actions when grasping an object with
the intention to place it accurately rather than with the intention
to throw it (Marteniuk et al., 1987; Louis-Dam et al., 1999). In
addition, Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) distinguished two types of
intentions. The motor intention refers to the mental state that
causes the execution of voluntary action (e.g., to put a glass on
a table). However, the same motor intention could involve a
conspecific (e.g., put the glass on a table for your child) or not
(e.g., put the glass on the table to drink from it). This later level
of description is referred to as the social intention that is, the
intention to affect a conspecific’s behavior. According to these
same authors, only themotor intention influences the execution of
an action, since the same spatial constraints could serve different
social intentions. This is known in the literature as the Dr. Jekyll
andMr. Hyde paradox (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005). Interestingly,
recent studies have shade doubt on these affirmations by showing
that specific changes in the kinematics of the arm and hand
movements can be revealed when investigating the effects of the
social context on the execution of motor sequences (Ferri et al.,
2011a; Gianelli et al., 2011; Innocenti et al., 2012; Scorolli et al.,
2014). But more specifically, it has been suggested that when
endorsing a social intention, humans tend to amplify the spatio-
temporal parameters of their movements. When planned with a
social intention in mind, a subject’s hand tends to move with
higher hand paths (Becchio et al., 2008; Quesque et al., 2013;
Quesque and Coello, 2014), slower velocities (Becchio et al., 2008;
Lewkowicz et al., 2013) and longer movement durations (Ferri
et al., 2011b; Quesque et al., 2013; Quesque and Coello, 2014).
From these variations in execution, it could then be possible for an
observer to distinguish different social goals driving similarmotor
actions.
In the present contribution, we defined the kinematic deviances
due to social intentions as the systematic difference between the
kinematic features [e.g., movement time (MT), peak velocity, peak
height] of two executed movements that have the same motor
constraints (e.g., start and stop position, object shape, target shape,
object initial, and final position) but executed for different social
intents. The use of commonkinematic features ofmovements is an
important step for researchers to quantify accurately the deviances
due to social intentions (Ansuini et al., 2014). Nonetheless, we
underline that our definition of the kinematic deviance is not
restricted to a specific parameter. Rather, we hypothesize that it is
a mechanism that affects multiple components of the movement
and its preparation. Thus, the expression of kinematic deviance
in terms of specific kinematic features could vary depending
of the type of action, the target object position and shape, and
various other motor constraints. In other words, when changing
themotor constraints of an action, onewould also change its social
deviance. Hence, to characterize the kinematic deviance due to
social intention one needs to disentangle the multiple kinematic
features to determine the potential candidates. By controlling
precisely the external constraints of executed movements in real-
time (Lewkowicz and Delevoye-Turrell, 2015), it is possible to
verify that the significant deviances of kinematic features are
not due to specific motor constraints but rather to internal
determinants (see also Ansuini et al., 2015), which would give
scientific basis for a better understanding of the Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde paradox (Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005). Whereas it has
already been shown that the early deviants of kinematic features
could be directly exploited to help detect the underlying intention
of an observed action (Sartori et al., 2011; Lewkowicz et al., 2013),
it is still unclear whether the sensitivity to kinematic deviances is
in relationship with the motor expertise or the social skills of the
external observer.
A number of recent studies have shown that motor training
directly influences action observation (Hecht et al., 2001; Casile
and Giese, 2006). Especially in the case of very skilled observers,
for example, in sports (Abernethy and Zawi, 2007; Abernethy
et al., 2008; Aglioti et al., 2008), and artistic activity (Calvo-Merino
et al., 2005, 2006), experts systematically outmatch novices in
recognizing and predicting the outcome of observed action but
also in detecting deceptive intentions (Jackson et al., 2006; Cañal-
Bruland and Schmidt, 2009; Sebanz and Shiffrar, 2009). These
results are in line with the hypothesis that common codes for
perception and action (Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001) can
be used to simulate observed actions and thus, gain a better
prediction and understanding of motor outcome (Blakemore and
Decety, 2001; Jeannerod, 2001; Wolpert et al., 2003; Grush, 2004;
Wilson and Knoblich, 2005; Uithol et al., 2011). In addition,
within the framework of the mirror neuron system (Cattaneo and
Rizzolatti, 2009), it has been claimed that the same mechanisms
would be involved during the imagery of a motor act directed to
an object and the actual execution of that same motor act (e.g.,
Jeannerod and Decety, 1995; Ehrsson et al., 2003; Decety and
Grèzes, 2006). The ability to detect social deviants should then be
correlated to motor expertise and simulation abilities.
The processing of others’ movements is also very important
for communication and adaptive social behavior. Individuals
who exhibit deficits in visual biological motion processing are
also compromised on daily-life social perception (see Pavlova,
2012, for a review). When one interacts with another person, it
is assumed implicitly that common thoughts are shared. Thus,
in social contexts, we unconsciously spend time predicting the
behavior of others on the basis of what we would do ourselves
in the same situation. One may up to a certain extent try to
place our own self within the other person’s mind, beliefs and
desires. This complex cognitive function is referred to as having
a “theory of mind” (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), taking an
intentional stance (Dennett, 1987), or mentalizing (Frith, 1989).
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Mentalizing has been studied using awide range of tasks including
reading stories (Fletcher et al., 1995; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003),
looking at cartoons (Brunet et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000), and
watching simple animations (Castelli et al., 2000). It has recently
been proposed that during action observations the neural basis
of the “theory of mind” is more recruited when the observer is
explicitly asked to interpret the scene in terms of high-level goals
than it is when focusing on lower-level intentions (Van Overwalle
andBaetens, 2009). In such a case, recognizing social deviantsmay
be associated to the same mechanisms, which participate in the
recognition process of body and face for social cognition.
In the current study, our goal was to test whether by
maintaining the motor intention identical an observer is still
able to dissociate between social and personal intentions in
movements performed toward an object. After recording trials
of actors performing social and personal reach to grasp actions
and verifying that the kinematics were indeed dissociable, we
conducted two experiments of action observation in which the
participants’ task was to categorize trials as a function of their
social scope. InExperiment 1, wewere specifically interested in the
individual differences that may be observed in the ability to read
social intentions. In order to gain an insight in the psychological
factors that may be involved in the capacity of participants to
understand the social action-outcome, we used questionnaires
to capture both social cognition and motor imagery abilities. In
Experiment 2, we probed the nature of the kinematic deviances
of observed movements, which contributed to the categorizing of
social and personal intentions. For this, we used post-recording
treatments in order to control precisely for the amount of
temporal information available within the movie clips. Through
the alterations of specific properties of 3D motion kinematics,
we were able to test the effects of a progressive normalization of
deviances on the participants’ ability to categorize the action as
being personal or social.
Experiment 1: Inter Individual Differences
to Recognize Social Patterns
In this first study, we tested whether the ability to recognize social
intention through the decoding of social deviants was related to
motor imagery and/or social cognition abilities.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-five healthy young adults (seven males; mean age:
24.7; SD: 3.0) participated in the experiment. All had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and had no prior knowledge
of the experimental goals. They gave informed consent
before participating in the experimental session that lasted
approximately 30 min. The protocol received approval from the
ethics committee for Human Sciences of the University of Lille 3.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Stimuli
To create the experimental material, we filmed two naïve adults
seated at a table, facing each other, and participating in a short
cooperative game. The game consisted in displacing a little
wooden dowel (width 2 cm; height 4 cm) between the thumb
and the index finger to different locations. Their sequential
actions were time-locked to a series of broadcasted sounds.
The first move of the game was always performed by the same
member of the dyad (named here, the “actor”) and consisted
in displacing the dowel from an initial location to a central
target. After this preparatory action, a subsequent main action
was to be performed either by the actor (personal condition) or
by the partner (social condition). Two blocks of 15 trials were
performed: In one block, the actor performed all the preparatory
and the main actions, the partner being just an observer. In
the other block, the actor performed the preparatory actions
and the main actions were always performed by the partner.
Meanwhile, the actor’s movements were recorded using a video
camera (Logitech webcam model c270) to record the scene. In
addition, four Oqus infrared cameras (Qualisys system) were
used to record the upper-body kinematics. Five infrared reflective
markers were placed on the index (base and tip), the thumb (tip),
the wrist (scaphoïd and pisiform) of the actor; one marker was
placed at the top of the object. The calibration of the cameras
provided the means to reach a standard deviation smaller than
0.2 mm, at a 200 Hz sampling rate.
A particular attention was taken to suppress all contextual
information from the video clips (see Figure 1A). Only the arm
of the actor and the target object were framed within the video
clips of the 30 preparatory actions. The video clips that were used
as stimuli consisted in a sequential action of two motor elements
(1) reach to grasp and (2) move to place. The video clips were
cut exactly one frame after the actor finished placing the object.
Movies were compressed with FFdshow codec (MJPEG) at 30
frames per second with a screen resolution of 640  480 pixels.
3D kinematics were analyzed with RTMocap toolbox (Lewkowicz
and Delevoye-Turrell, 2015). Positional data points were filtered
using a dual fourth-order Butterworth low-pass filter (fc= 15 Hz;
forward and backward) and tangential 3D instantaneous velocities
were calculated. A threshold of 20 mms 1 was used to
determine the onset of movement (reaction time, RT). All velocity
trajectories were bell shaped and consisted in two “bells,” the first
corresponding to the reach to grasp element, the second being the
move to place element of the preparatory action. The amplitude
of peak velocity of the first element (APV1) was extracted using
the local maxima (first 0-crossing of acceleration). The end of the
first element was determined as the time of occurrence of the local
minima (second 0-crossing of acceleration) between the first and
the second element-peaks (see vertical arrow in Figure 1). The
duration of the first element (MT1) was calculated as the time
interval between the onset and the end of the first element. The
amplitude of the peak height of trajectories (APH1) was defined as
the maximum z coordinate of the wrist measured in the grasping
element and the lift to place element. APV2, MT2, and APH2
are the corresponding kinematic parameters described above but
extracted from the second move to place element of the motor
sequence. Table 1 presents the characteristics of the movement
parameters that were measured, e.g., RT, MT, peak wrist velocity,
and height of hand trajectory. Figure 2 presents the scatterplot of
amplitude of peak velocity against MT in order to confirm none
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FIGURE 1 | (A) A typical example of the video stimuli that was used both in
Experiments 1 and 2 to test the role of motor deviants for the categorization of
social and personal object-centered actions. One can note the neutral context
that was used with the placement of 3D reflexive markers that provided us the
means to verify the kinematic deviants between social and personal movements
during the validation phase of the video database. (B) Velocity curves of the
corresponding trial illustrating the double bell shaped profiles that are observed
in the present reach to grasp task. Reaction times (RT in ms) and movement
times of the first element of the sequence (MT of reach in ms) may have been
used by the observers to dissociate social from personal actions.
TABLE 1 | Mean kinematic parameters of the preparatory action for both the personal and the social trials.
RT APV1 APV2 MT1 MT2 APH1 APH2
** * * *** * ** *
Personal intention 616 582 525 440 508 58 63
Social intention 702 547 457 478 545 60 65
Median values 665 572 487 457 533 59 64
Frequency of personal trials > median 4/15 10/15 5/15 3/15 5/15 4/15 5/15
Frequency of social trials > median 11/15 5/15 10/15 12/15 10/15 11/15 10/15
For each parameter, the median values for the totality of the trials are reported and the frequency of trials superior to this value is specified in each condition. RT, reaction time; APV,
amplitude of peak velocity; MT, movement time; APH, amplitude of peak hand height, for the first (1) reaching element or the second (2) grasping element. The asterisks revealed the
parameters for which significant differences were found between the two distributions in the personal and the social conditions using the median test (*p< 0.05; **p< 0.01;***p< 0.001).
negligible proportions of the plots that are discriminative between
social and personal trials. Using comparison to themedian values,
pre-analysis confirmed the possibility to dissociate personal from
social trials on the basis of RT, MT and height of grasping phase
(APH).
Individual evaluations of social and imagery sensitivity
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, which will be referred
to as the RME-test in the following sections (Baron-Cohen
et al., 1997, 2001) was designed to measure each individuals’
sensitivity to social cues and in particular the participants’ ability
to understand others’ complex mental states. This test has shown
a high potential to distinguish an individual’s tendency to attend
to others’ intentions in joint cognitive tasks (Ruys and Aarts,
2010). In the RME-test, participants were required to categorize
eye-regions of 36 facial expressions by selecting a mental state
label that matched the perceived expression, selecting one out of
the four terms proposed. In the present experiment, participants
completed a French version of this test (Prevost et al., 2014) and
were encouraged to select the appropriate term as fast as possible.
Overall, the more people attend to the intentions of others, the
higher are their scores on the RME-test. We also administered
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FIGURE 2 | Kinematic deviances are presented with the amplitude of
peak velocity plotted as a function of movement time. Scatterplots
reveal none negligible proportions of the plots that are discriminative and thus,
may be used to dissociate social from personal intention.
a French version (Loison et al., 2013) of the Movement Imagery
Questionnaire—Revised Second version (MIQ-RS, Gregg et al.,
2010) of the Movement Imagery Questionnaire—Revised (MIQ-
R, Hall andMartin, 1997). This questionnaire is a reliablemeasure
of motor imagery that distinguishes kinesthetic motor imagery
from visual motor imagery. Participants were required to perform
and imagine daily life actions that were similar in the two
subscales, involving both upper and lower limbs.
Procedure
Participants were seated at a table in a silent experimental box,
facing the experimenter. They took part in a short cooperative
game to get familiarized with the paradigm. These pre-test trials
consisted in similarmanipulativemovements than that performed
by the actor in the stimuli video. Participants performed 15 trials
for which they were required to pick and place a wooden dowel at
the center of the table for their own purpose and 15 trials forwhich
the wooden dowel was picked and placed for the experimenter.
After this familiarization phase, participants were instructed to
watch and categorize previously recorded videos clips from the
same two conditions. Participants had to categorize a total of
30 videos (15 social and 15 personal). The instructions before
categorization were given orally as follow (“Is the actor placing the
dowel for a personal use?” OR “Is the actor placing the dowel to give
it to his partner?”).
The videos stimuli in the categorization task were displayed on
a gray background on a laptop computer using the PsychToolbox
for Matlab (Natick, MA, USA). Before each trial, a white fixation
cross-appeared on the gray screen during a variable interval of
500–1000 ms. After each video presentation, as soon as the clip
ended, a blank screen was shown during which participants were
prompt to give their decision. They were instructed to categorize
each movie clip as fast and as accurately as possible. The response
keysweremarkedwith tape placed directly on the azerty computer
keyboard (“a” for social and “p” for personal). The response keys
were counterbalanced across participants. No feedback was given
during the experiment. Finally, the participants were required to
complete the French version of the RME-test and theMIQ-R. The
order of presentation of the two tests was also counterbalanced
across participants. After the entire completion of the experiment,
participants were asked to comment on the general degree of
confidence that they had in their answers in the categorization
task. Finally, participants obtained a short debriefing period and
were thanked for their participation.
Analysis
Response times were calculated as the time interval between the
presentation of the last frame of the video and the participant’s
key press. For the analyses of the amount of correct responses,
it is to note that in our experiment the error in judging
one kind of stimulus (e.g., social) was redundant with the
correct judgment of the other kind of stimulus (e.g., personal).
Consequently, the results were expressed in total percentage of
correct responses (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). Scores for each
categorywere compared to the reference constant, i.e., the random
answer value of 0.50, with a single sample t-test. To test whether
the classifications rates would entail any substantial individual
differences in the perception of social intention, we performed
correlation analyses. We then checked whether the percentage of
correct responseswas correlatedwith the social cognitionmeasure
and with the motor and visual imagery measures, separately.
Final score in the French version of the RME-test was computed
on 34 items, excluding the items 13 and 23 from analysis as
recommended (Prevost et al., 2014). Concerning the imagery
measures, the two scores (kinesthetic; visual) were calculated on
a 7 points scale. All analyses were conducted two-tailed and the
alpha level of significance was set to 0.05.
Results
Categorization Performance and Response Time
The results revealed that on average participants were able
to categorize the underlying intention above chance level
(M = 65.7%, SD = 15.8 vs. 50%), t(24) = 4.980, p < 0.001.
There were no significant differences in the percentage of correct
categorization for the personal intention (M = 68%, SD = 19.7)
and the social intention (M = 63.4%, SD = 19.8), t(24) = 0.95,
p = 0.35. Moreover, the results revealed no significant effects
of the stimulus type on mean response times. Participants
categorized the video clips presenting a personal intention as
quickly (M = 600 ms, SD = 0.39) as the video clips presenting a
social intention (M = 570 ms, SD= 0.32), t(24)= 0.58, p= 0.58.
Correlation With Individual Traits
On average, participants obtained a score of M = 5.8, SD = 1.2
in visual imagery and M = 4.8, SD = 1.3 in kinesthetic imagery
as assessed by the Movement Imagery Questionnaire. The results
revealed an absence of correlation with the percentage of correct
categorization for both the visual imagery score (R = 0.125,
p = 0.551) and the kinesthetic imagery score (R = 0.194,
p = 0.354). The results of the RME-test revealed a mean score of
28.24, SD= 3.5. Our results showed that the RME-test scores were
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FIGURE 3 | Graphical illustration of the correlation parameters that
were obtained in Experiment 1 between the individual scores of the
Read the Mind in the Eyes Test (RME-test), and the percentage of
correct answers given in the categorization task. Black dots and white
dots represent female and male participants, respectively.
positively correlated with the percentage of correct categorization
(R= 0.677, p< 0.001), indicating that a higher score in the RME-
is associated to a higher performance in the categorization task
(see Figure 3). Concerning the degree of relationship between the
questionnaires, the RME-test scores were related neither to the
kinesthetic imagery scores (R= 0.006, p= 0.975) nor to the visual
imagery scores (R = 0.278, p = 0.178). Finally, the scores on the
two dimensions of the Movement Imagery Questionnaire were
not correlated (R = 0.132, p= 0.527).
Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to test for the individual
differences that may be observed in the ability to read social
intentions. Firstly, confronted to short video clips of “pick and
place” moves, participants were able to categorize the intention
(“social” vs. “personal”) of the actor above chance level. Given
the effort made to produce stimuli presenting an absence of
contextual information, this result confirms the idea that not
only motor intention (Méary et al., 2005; Manera et al., 2011;
Sartori et al., 2011; Lewkowicz et al., 2013) but also social
intention can be inferred from the kinematics of a movement,
as suggested by Ansuini et al. (2015). Secondly, it is to note
that not all participants were equally talented in performing
the task. Particularly, the ability of participants to discriminate
between social and personal intentions was highly linked to the
scores obtained in the social cognition test but was not related
to the scores obtained in the motor imagery questionnaires. Such
dissociation corroborates recent findings showing that sensitivity
to use subtle cues in biological motion is linked to social but
not to motor imagery measures (Miller and Saygin, 2013). More
specifically as reported here, the authors showed that form cues
correlated more with the social than with the imagery measures
suggesting that even if social cognition andmotor imagery predict
sensitivity to biological motion, these skills tap into different
aspects of perception. In our case, the results comfort the idea
that social abilities help detect modulations of trajectories even
in very simple and fast motor actions such as a reach to grasp task
performed at natural speed.
Experiment 1, gave us the opportunity to assess participants’
ability to perceive social intentions from motor actions. However,
it did not give us insights on the actual perceptual cues used
by participants to solve the decision task. Consequently, in
Experiment 2, we focused on the question of “how” participants
could perceive social intentions from motor actions. For this
purpose, we used post-recording modifications of videos clips in
order to determinewhich crucial aspects of the kinematic deviants
were relevant for participants in making their categorization
decision. Finally, during the debriefing sessions of Experiment 1
the vast majority of participants reported that they felt as if they
responded randomly in the categorization task, reporting a very
low degree of confidence in their responses. However, due to the
absence of quantitativemeasures of themeta-cognitive judgments
from the participants, it was not possible to draw straight
conclusions. Experiment 2 gave the opportunity to investigate this
point more rigorously by obtaining systematic auto-evaluation
of metacognitive knowledge through the use of analogical-
scales.
Experiment 2: Content Information to
Recognize Social Patterns
This study was conducted to assess whether participants could
distinguish between social and personalmovements even after the
specific properties of the 3Dmotor kinematics were flattened out.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-three healthy young adults (six males; mean age: 25.8;
SD: 5.0) participated in the second experiment. All had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and had no prior knowledge of
the experimental goals. These participants did not take part in
Experiment 1 and gave informed consent before participating in
the experimental session that lasted approximately 20 min. All
participants completed in a previous session the French version
of the RME-test (Prevost et al., 2014) and only those who had
a minimal score of 27 (corresponding to the French median
score) were selected to take part in the following experiment. The
protocol received approval from the ethics committee for Human
Sciences of the University of Lille 3.
Apparatus and Stimuli
In this experiment, two-step actions were recorded from a
different actor but following the same design as in Experiment
1 in order to generate new stimuli videos. Table 2 presents the
characteristics of actions parameters in the personal and social
condition. As expected, significant differences were obtained in
the 3D motion kinematics between personal and social trials
for many motor parameters and especially those that will be
manipulated, i.e., RT and MT of the first element of the motor
sequence (MT1).
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TABLE 2 | Mean kinematic parameters of the preparatory action for both the personal and the social trials.
RT APV1 APV2 MT1 MT2 APH1 APH2
* * ** **
Personal intention 395 590 529 417 501 58 58
Social intention 438 618 487 451 475 63 65
Median values 408 599 509 438 485 61 63
Frequency of personal trials > median 5/15 9/15 11/15 4/15 9/15 6/15 4/15
Frequency of social trials > median 10/15 6/15 5/15 11/15 7/15 9/15 11/15
The asterisks revealed the parameters for which significant differences were found between the two distributions in the personal and the social conditions using the median test
(*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01).
In order to control for the amount of temporal and kinematic
information available to participants, we used post-recording
modification of the videos. This manipulation led to creation
of three types of stimuli. Indeed, depending on the condition,
the stimuli that were displayed could be the original video clips
(RT + MT1 deviant), video clips normalized according to RTs
(MT1 deviant) or video clips normalized according to the end of
the grasping action (No deviant).
The modification of each video clip was achieved on-line
as follows. First, the mean of the parameters that needed to
be homogenized was calculated across all trials (social and
personal). Second, the video clips were displayed at an overall
refreshment rate so that the display time of this parameter
corresponded to the mean pre-determined value. For example,
in the MT1 deviant condition, the parameter that needed to
be homogenized was the RT. Thus, using the kinematic data,
a deviance ratio was calculated for the section of the video
clip corresponding to the overall rate at which the RT section
of the video should be presented in order to match the mean
pre-determined value. We then interpolated the video frames
(30 hz) with the true refreshment rate of the screen (60 hz)
and replaced each video frame accordingly to the deviance
ratio scaled to this final refreshment rate. In other words, the
modifications brought to the duration of each video clip was
spread out through the successive frames rather than being
performed through an abrupt modification a given section of the
video (e.g., by removing a frame). This manipulation gave us the
opportunity to maintain the majority of the biological content of
each movement.
Except for the modifications brought to the videos, the
experimental design was identical to the one used in Experiment
1. In addition, analogical scales (10-cm long lines coding for
“chance level” to the far left and “high confidence” to the far right)
were included at the end of each trial in order to gain information
about the metacognitive knowledge that participants’ possessed
on their self-evaluation performances.
Procedure
Participants were seated at a table in a silent experimental
box and had to perform the categorization task with the same
instructions as in Experiment 1. They categorized the three
sets of videos in three distinct sessions that were completed
in a random order (counter-balanced across participants).
After each session, they were asked to auto-evaluate the trust
they had in their present classification rate on analogical
scales.
Analysis
Mean percentages of correct responses, mean response times and
mean self-evaluation scores were calculated for each condition
and submitted to a repeated-measure ANOVA with condition
(RT + MT1 deviant, MT1 deviant, No deviant) as within factors.
The post hoc Bonferroni test was used when needed. We also
conducted sub-analyses for the percentages of correct responses:
scores for each category were compared to the reference constant,
i.e., the random answer value of 0.50, using a single sample t-
test. All analyses were conducted two-tailed and the alpha level
of significance was set to 0.05.
Results
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed an effect of video
type [F(1,22) = 3.02, p = 0.05] on the percentage of correct
categorization. Post hoc contrast analysis revealed a significant
higher rate of correct judgments in the natural condition
(M = 57.5%, SD = 10) compared to the RT + MT1 deviant
condition (M= 51.9%, SD= 10; t= 2.32, p< 0.05). Furthermore,
the performances in the MT1 deviant condition were located in
the middle range (M = 54.3%, SD= 08) not differing statistically
from the two other conditions (t =  0.22, p = 0.83), suggesting
a progressive decrease across the three experimental conditions.
Two-sided t-tests comparing performances against chance level
(50%) in the categorization task revealed that participants were
significantly above chance in two of the three conditions (see
Figure 4). More specifically, participants were able to categorize
the underlying intention above chance level when videos were
presented in the RT + MT1 deviant condition [t(22) = 3.6,
p< 0.01] and in theMT1 deviant condition [t(22)= 2.4, p< 0.05].
However, they were not able to respond above chance level when
videos were presented in the No deviant condition [t(22) = 0.9,
p= 0.37].
Concerning response times, we found no significant effects
of video type [F(1,22) = 2.19, p = 0.15]. Furthermore, the
participants’ responses on the analogical scales used to evaluate
metacognitive knowledge about performance self-assessment did
not differ between conditions [F(2,44) = 0,02, p = 0.98]. With an
overall mean of 68%, these observations indicate that participants
found the task feasible but did not explicitly judge that a certain
type of video was harder to categorize than another.
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FIGURE 4 | Mean percentage of correct categorization for the three
experimental conditions with standard errors (bars). Note that when
post-treatment of the videos were performed to normalize both reaction times
(RT in ms) and the movement times of the first reach element of the sequence
(MT1 in ms), participants were not able to categorize the social intention of the
visual kinematics above chance level (illustrated here by the gray dotted
horizontal line).
Discussion
The driving question in the second study was to replicate those
findings presented in Experiment 1 and assess to what extent
kinematic deviants may be used to discriminate social intention
in actions that have an exact same motor goal. As in study 1,
participants were thus presented with short video clips and were
asked to categorize the social intention of the actor. However,
these video clips contained different amounts of informative
deviants as the videos could be totally informative (original
videos as in Experiment 1), partially informative (videos were
normalized to RTs) or none informative (videos were normalized
to the end of the grasping action). Using video clips of a different
naïve actor, we replicated here the results reported in Experiment
1: individuals are able to distinguish between social intention
and personal intention through the simple observation of motor
kinematics. The fact that the overall categorization performance in
the second study was lower than that seen in the first study could
be due to the present of fewer kinematic deviances in the stimuli
material. It is the case that when comparing trials in the social
and the personal conditions, the kinematic analyses revealedmore
differences in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. It is true that
in daily social interactions, the actions of certain individuals are
easier “to read” than others. This situation—that we all have
experienced, is reflected here by the fact that the actor who
participated in Experiment 2 had kinematic variances that were
less marked than the one participating in Experiment 1. Thus, our
findings suggest that the kinematic signature of social intention
is difficult to detect within a unique individual. Nevertheless,
even if the amount of kinematic information was less present in
Experiment 2, we were still able to cancel out the participants’
ability to read social intention through the modification of the
kinematic features. Hence, social intention—even if weak, is
contained within the kinematic variances of body movement.
The second important result that confirmed our initial
hypothesis of the importance of motor deviants for intention
reading was that the percentage of correct identification was
proportional to the amount of deviants contained within motor
kinematics. The original clips were better categorized than
those stimuli that were partially normalized, suggesting that the
categorical decisions were based on a spatio-temporal integration
of that information contained within the actor’s movements.
By asking participants to use analogical scales to self-evaluate
performance levels, we furthermore showed that performance
levels are not dependent on an explicit conscious decision process.
Indeed, even if the percentage of correction identification was
significantly affected by the deterioration of the video content,
the participants’ metacognitive judgment was not. Participants
did not explicitly detect differences in the informative values of
the video clips and furthermore, did not judge their performance
in the categorization task as being better or worse as a function
of the informative content of the videos. Overall, these findings
reveal the implicit nature of motor deviants to facilitate social
interaction and confirm previous results found in the social
literature suggesting that contextual information modulates
social behaviors outside of awareness (Knoblich and Sebanz,
2008).
General Discussion
Previous behavioral studies have revealed that the context in
which object-oriented actions take place and their relevance for
human interactions can affect the way very simple actions are
executed (Ferri et al., 2011a; Gianelli et al., 2011; Innocenti et al.,
2012; Scorolli et al., 2014). In the present contribution, we were
interested in assessing the effects of social context on the temporal
and the spatial parameters of hand trajectory in the basic action
of reaching for and grasping an object, either to move it for
self directed purposes (personal intention) or for the use of the
object by a partner (social intention). Our question was the
following: Could a naïve observer of the scene detect that the
object was going to be reached with a social intention? What
in the behavioral dynamics could be used as social cues? This
experimental situation is very similar to that observed in daily
experiences for which many of our interactions with conspecifics
are not conveyed through language. For instance, it has been
shown that both structural and dynamic information of body
movement through space and time are taken into account for
the recognition of point light-display of moving humans (Troje
et al., 2005), or for the recognition of another’s emotions when
the facial expression is not visible (Atkinson et al., 2004; Meeren
et al., 2005). Likewise, in the present contribution, we showed
that it is possible for a naïve observer to understand social
intention of individuals performing an object-oriented motor
action.
Movies were taken from a situation in which a participant
picked up and placed an object knowing in advance whether
herself or a partner will perform the next action in the sequence.
With this method, we created stimuli in which kinematic variants
(RT, MT and trajectory height) were the only factor conveying
social meaning. Even though the kinematic variations due to
social intention were small (a few millimeters within a few tens of
milliseconds), motor deviants were present in our trajectories in a
very repetitive and distinctiveway (seeFigure 2) confirming other
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experimental results reported in social oriented tasks (Becchio
et al., 2008; Quesque et al., 2013). Here, we confirm in two
different sets of actors that human observers are able to exploit
these very small kinematic deviances to discriminate the social
intention above chance level.
In Experiment 1, we focused on the personal determinants,
which could explain inter individual differences in the ability
to read the social intention of an action. We thus hypothesized
that intention reading would be associated to an individual’s
competence to either infer complex mental states to others or to
use motor imagery to predict motor outcome from movement
kinematics. We only found a positive correlation with the
social skill as it was previously reported with biological motion
processing (Miller and Saygin, 2013). The existence of a close
relation between social abilities and the perception of social
intention is not surprising as such. Whereas healthy adults
are able to perceive intentions (Runeson and Frykholm, 1983;
Blakemore and Decety, 2001) and emotions from point-light
displays (Dittrich et al., 1996; Pollick et al., 2001; Atkinson et al.,
2004; Grezes et al., 2007), this ability seems to be clearly impaired
in patients showing deficits in social interactions such as in autism
(Blake et al., 2003; Freitag et al., 2008; Parron et al., 2008; Cook
et al., 2009; Centelles et al., 2012) and schizophrenia (Kim et al.,
2005, 2011). The question that remains is then why does the
correct discrimination of social intention not correlate with the
motor imagery ability of the observer? We found that increased
ability in motor imagery does not in itself help participants to
understand correctly the social intention of the movement. One
possible interpretation is that the motor imagery questionnaire
probes more heavily the explicit processing of motor activity (e.g.,
goals, consciousmonitoring) rather than the implicit sensitivity to
subtle kinematic variations.
In Experiment 2, we focused on the hypothesis according
to which observers may be able to read the social intention
through the exploitation of the kinematic deviances between
two movements executed with the same motor intention but
different social intention. With post-recording treatments, we
impoverished the temporal aspects of visual kinematics contained
within the video clips to cancel out the ability to read social
intention, confirming the central role of these temporal deviants
in predicting social outcome. It is now generally accepted
that when we execute a movement, we predict the sensory
consequences of that movement through generative or forward
models (Wolpert et al., 1995, 2003; Wolpert and Miall, 1996).
These predictions can then be used to refine motor control
problems induced by delayed feedback and sensory noise, but
can also play a role to determine the most likely outcome of
an observed action (Kilner et al., 2007). It has recently been
suggested that a similar system can be used to understand
others mental states (Oztop et al., 2005) and more specifically
intentions (Ansuini et al., 2015). The results presented here
confirm this hypothesis by showing that without temporal
deviants, individuals lose the ability to categorize social outcome.
These findings indicate that predictive timing may also be the key
to the ability of decoding social intention through the observation
ofmotor kinematics. Interestingly, break points were also relevant:
RT normalization (in MT1 deviant condition) was here shown
to also decrease categorization accuracy. This is congruent with
previous studies that have shown that individuals are able to infer
the subjective confidence of another person simply through the
observation of RTs (Patel et al., 2012).Hence, those cognitive states
that are based on predictive temporal propertiesmay be correlated
to social skills. Future studies need now to generalize these ideas
and confirm that social reading is dependent on the accumulation
of prediction errors, i.e., not only on the when but also on the
how long of an on-flowing action sequence. Here we suggest that
this would be done through the multi-integration of temporal
deviants within a bilateral interaction of top-down and bottom up
processes (see also Hillebrandt et al., 2014, for a neuro-anatomical
account of this perspective).
It is the case that studies have reported gender effects related
to social reading (Alaerts et al., 2011; Sokolov et al., 2011).
Our results could suffer from the fact that a greater number
of female individuals participated in the study. However, the
gendermain effect was none significant with themale participants
performing at similar levels than the female participants both
in the RMET and in the categorization task (see Figure 3).
Furthermore, the tendency for woman to do better than men
in the RMET was significantly true in the first version of the
test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) but this was only marginally
the case in the second version of the test (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001), which is the one we used. Finally, recent studies assessing
the gender question have shown that men even sometimes do
better than woman, e.g., in tasks using point-light displays to
recognize human locomotion (Krüger et al., 2013). Hence, our
results indicate that individual characteristics aremore valuable to
predict within gender abilities than the general gender property
itself. They are novel and confirm the usefulness of RMET for
predicting individual performances in (1) the recognition of
body language (Alaerts et al., 2011; Miller and Saygin, 2013)
and (2) the ability to detect other’s intention through body
movements (Ruys and Aarts, 2010), whether that person be a
man or a woman. A second point to note is the importance
in future studies to assess whether the results presented here
can be generalized to more ecological tasks. Indeed, the method
presented here using video clips could be further applied to create
experimental situations at second-person perspective including,
for instance, two participants performing a reach to grasp
task in a real interactive situation (see illustrated examples on
line through reference keys given in Lewkowicz and Delevoye-
Turrell, 2015). Furthermore, demonstrating that similar patterns
of results are obtained when not only two but multiple intentional
possibilities are presented would provide more ecological validity
for the social abilities reported in the present study (see Obhi,
2012).
In conclusion, the present study reveals that the ability to
implicitly use motor deviants from observed object-directed
actions represents the crucial factor for detecting social
intention. Furthermore, this ability seems to depend on
individual social cognition skills. Implicit judgments are often
considered as intuitive. As such, intuition has been defined in
the field of human robotics as our ability for direct knowledge,
for immediate insight without explicit reasoning. Intuitive
judgments are more or less accessible to individuals depending
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on a number of factors (e.g., physical salience, emotional and
motivational states, Kahneman, 2003). In the present study, we
suggest that an important aspect of intuitive interaction is the
power to detect the contained information within the temporal
aspects of body movements to prime the social expectancy of an
observer.
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